The German government’s ambitious drive to expand and modernize its green energy infrastructure has triggered new security concerns related to solar inverters. A draft law often referred to as the “Solarspitzen-Gesetz” (or, in English, the “Law for the Avoidance of Surpluses in Power Generation”) seeks to enable remote, real-time control of solar inverters in order to reduce electricity oversupply at peak times, such as around Easter and Pentecost. However, Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, or BSI) recently warned that foreign-made equipment could become a significant cybersecurity risk.

Remote Control of Solar Inverters

• What are inverters? Inverters (in German: Wechselrichter) convert the direct current (DC) that solar panels generate into alternating current (AC) suitable for use on the power grid.
• Why remote control? The German government aims to prevent electricity overproduction from solar panels during times of low consumption. The plan is to allow system operators or manufacturers to curtail output by remotely switching off or adjusting inverters. This avoids overloading the grid and the need for more disruptive local shutdowns.

The BSI’s Security Concerns

The core of the BSI’s warning centers on who manufactures and controls the inverters:

1. Predominance of Chinese Products
   Many inverters installed in Germany are produced by Chinese manufacturers. Under the new legislation, these manufacturers (and thus potentially the Chinese government) could have remote access to a substantial portion of Germany’s solar power infrastructure.

2. Vulnerability to Hacking
   Beyond concerns over foreign governmental influence, the BSI also highlights that if remote access is standard practice, hackers could exploit security vulnerabilities. Inverter management systems or cloud-based portals used by manufacturers might be targeted to disrupt power generation or tamper with grid stability.

3. Local vs. Global Control
   The BSI recommends that renewable energy installations, including photovoltaic systems, be operated locally wherever possible, with any remote management handled via secure, intelligent measuring systems (intelligente Messsysteme) vetted by German or EU standards.

Potential Impact on the Grid

• Stability vs. Security: At face value, remote inverter control solves a practical problem: balancing supply and demand. However, linking a critical grid component to systems potentially managed abroad raises the stakes for cybersecurity.
• Critical Infrastructure: Germany’s power grid is considered critical infrastructure. A successful attack or manipulation could jeopardize not just the grid’s stability, but also economic and national security interests.

The Debate Moving Forward

• EU-Wide Supply Chain Scrutiny: European authorities have already undertaken extensive discussions around 5G network infrastructure and the role of Chinese companies. With renewable energy now at the center of Europe’s decarbonization strategy, supply chain security of inverters, turbines, and other grid-related technologies has become part of a broader debate.
• Local Manufacturing Solutions: Some experts advocate the development of European-manufactured inverters to reduce dependence on outside sources.
• Stricter Regulations: The German government may refine the “Solarspitzen-Gesetz” to incorporate stricter security and certification requirements. The BSI’s call for local control could push lawmakers to mandate a more decentralized or at least German/EU-based remote management system.

The Gist

As the transition to green energy accelerates, ensuring grid stability while maintaining robust security is paramount. The potential for foreign interference or cyberattacks has prompted the BSI’s caution, particularly given the large market share of Chinese-manufactured inverters. Policymakers, industry players, and security experts now face the task of balancing environmental goals with the need to protect critical infrastructure.

Sources & Further Reading

• Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) — Advisories on cybersecurity for critical infrastructure
• German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action — Ongoing legislation regarding renewable energy and grid infrastructure
• European Commission – Studies on supply chain security for energy-related technologies